A 9/11-style bombing plan was scrapped before Hamas launched the attack on Israel: report

An Israeli rocket before hitting Gaza. Photo credit: AFP

But Hamas's ambitions extended beyond Gaza. The group actively sought financial and military support from regional powers, particularly Iran. Back in June 2021, Sinwar had written to Iranian officials asking for financial support to finance the October 7 attack. “We promise you that we will not waste a minute or a cent unless it means achieving this sacred goal,” Sinwar reportedly wrote.

This request resulted in an initial funding of $10 million, and later Hamas requested a staggering distribution of $500 million over two years.

Change of strategy

Although the attack was originally planned for late 2022, Hamas postponed it for more than a year. According to documents obtained by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and shared with The Washington Post, this delay was largely due to ongoing efforts to secure more substantial aid from Iran and Hezbollah.

In August 2023, Hamas deputy Khalil al-Hayya reportedly traveled to Lebanon to meet with Mohammed Said Izadi, a senior commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to discuss the operational details of the attack. Izadi expressed preliminary support for Iran and Hezbollah, but said they needed more time to “prepare the environment” for a broader regional escalation.

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Although Hamas had hoped for more direct involvement from these regional actors, the group ultimately launched the attack without their direct support. The exact reasons for this decision remain unclear, but the timing suggests several geopolitical factors. For example, Israel was close to deploying a new, advanced air defense system by mid-2023, which Hamas feared could thwart its attack if delayed further, the New York Times reported.

Furthermore, the deteriorating relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia—a potential breakthrough in regional diplomacy—likely prompted Hamas to act before those relations could solidify.

The internal unrest within Israel also played a role. In 2023, Israel struggled with mass protests and political unrest sparked by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's controversial judicial reforms. Hamas leaders viewed Israel's “internal situation” as a key weakness, arguing that the state was distracted by its own domestic crises and therefore more vulnerable to a major attack.

Plan a 9/11 style attack

One of the most shocking revelations from these documents is Hamas's original plan to carry out a 9/11-style bombing in Israel, targeting the famous Azrieli Towers in Tel Aviv, the Washington Post reported. These skyscrapers house offices, a shopping center and a main train station. The plan called for a devastating attack, reminiscent of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, with the aim of bringing down the towers and causing mass casualties.

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However, after months of discussions, Hamas concluded that it lacked the ability to implement such an ambitious plan. The group rejected the 9/11-style bombing and other bold proposals, such as using horse-drawn carriages as a “quick and light mechanism” to transport fighters through Israeli defenses without suspicion.

In September 2022, Hamas leaders believed they were ready to launch their attack, starting with attacks on Israeli military bases before expanding to civilian areas. However, the attack was postponed again. According to the reports, Sinwar and his top commanders continued to refine the plan, holding covert meetings with Iranian officials and planning for a broader regional conflict.

Element of surprise

One of the key factors in the success of Hamas' October 7 attack was its ability to mislead Israeli intelligence. For nearly two years, Hamas carefully cultivated the impression that it was more focused on governing Gaza and avoiding conflict with Israel. According to the documents, this deception was deliberate, as the Hamas leadership frequently discussed the need to lull Israel into a false sense of security.

In April 2022, after the Muslim holy month of Ramzan passed without major incident, Hamas leaders expressed relief that they had managed to “obscure the big idea.” According to the results, by avoiding skirmishes, Hamas was able to convince Israel that it was not planning a major offensive. The group continued this strategy in 2022 and 2023.

To ensure the success of this deception, Hamas kept its plans top secret. Only a few of its senior commanders, including Sinwar and Ismail Haniyeh, the group's political leader in Qatar who was recently killed in Tehran, were privy to the full extent of the attack plans. According to the findings, lower-ranking agents were only informed a few hours before the attack.

The decision to strike

After years of planning and months of preparation, Hamas finally decided to strike on October 7, 2023. The timing was significant: It coincided with Simhat Torah, a Jewish holiday when Israel would be vulnerable due to its observance of the holiday and reduced military readiness. The group debated launching the attack earlier, on Yom Kippur in late September, but ultimately chose Simhat Torah as the optimal time, the findings say.

Photo credit: Getty

On the morning of October 7, Hamas militants entered southern Israel and carried out a devastating, multi-pronged attack. The group's fighters attacked Israeli military bases and civilian communities, taking hundreds of hostages, many of whom are still held captive in Gaza.

While Hamas launched the attack without the direct involvement of its regional allies, the conflict quickly escalated beyond Gaza's borders. Within 24 hours of the attack, the Iran-backed militant group Hezbollah, based in Lebanon, began firing rockets at Israeli positions along the northern border. This created a second front in the conflict, with the possibility of further escalation involving Iran and its regional proxies.

What Iran said

The extent of Iran and Hezbollah's involvement in the October 7 attack remains a matter of debate. Iranian leaders have denied direct involvement and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has said Tehran was not responsible for planning or carrying out the attack. U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies have also suggested that key Iranian officials may have been surprised by the timing of the attack.

Iran's permanent mission to the United Nations in New York rejected claims that Tehran was linked to the October 7 Hamas surprise attack.

The Iranian mission responded to questions from The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal by saying: “While Hamas officials based in (the Qatari capital) Doha have stated that they have no information about the operation and only those based in Gaza “Hamas' military wing.” “